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Cass R. Sunstein† 
For regulation, some people argue in favor of the maximin rule, by which 
public officials seek to eliminate the worst worst-cases. The maximin rule has 
not played a formal role in regulatory policy in the Unites States, but in the 
context of climate change, pandemics, or new and emerging technologies, 
regulators who are unable to conduct standard cost-benefit analysis might be 
drawn to it. In general, the maximin rule is not a good idea for regulatory 
policy, because it is likely to reduce rather than to increase well-being. But 
under four imaginable conditions, that rule is attractive. (1) The worst-cases 
are very bad, and not improbable, so that it may make sense to eliminate them 
under conventional cost-benefit analysis. (2) The worst-case outcomes are 
highly improbable, but they are so bad that even in terms of expected value, it 
may make sense to eliminate them under conventional cost-benefit analysis. (3) 
Observers (including regulators) are in circumstances of Knightian 
uncertainty, where they cannot assign probabilities to imaginable outcomes. 
(4) The probability distributions may include “fat tails,” in which very bad 
outcomes are more probable than is usual; it may make sense to eliminate 
those outcomes for that reason. With respect to (3) and (4), the challenges arise 
when eliminating dangers also threatens to impose very high costs or to 
eliminate very large gains. There are also reasons to be cautious about 
imposing regulation when technology offers the promise of “moonshots,” or 
“miracles,” offering a low probability or an uncertain probability of 
extraordinarily high payoffs. Miracles may present a mirror image of worst-
case scenarios. 
 
† Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University. I am grateful to Tyler Cowen, Annie 
Duke, and Eric Posner for superb comments on an earlier draft and to Dinis Cheian for extraordinary 
research assistance. A few sections of this Article draw on, while also significantly revising and 
updating, some sections of Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841 
(2006). 
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Uncertainty must be taken in a sense radically distinct from the familiar 
notion of Risk, from which it has never been properly separated . . . . 
The essential fact is that ‘risk’ means in some cases a quantity 
susceptible of measurement, while at other times it is something 
distinctly not of this character; and there are far-reaching and crucial 
differences in the bearings of the phenomena depending on which of the 
two is really present and operating. 
Frank Knight1 
 
One could certainly elicit from a political scientist the subjective 
probability that he attaches to the prediction that Norway in the year 
3000 will be a democracy rather than a dictatorship, but would anyone 
even contemplate acting on the basis of this numerical magnitude? 
Jon Elster2 
 
In some cases, the level of scientific uncertainty may be so large that 
you can only present discrete alternative scenarios without assessing the 
relative likelihood of each scenario quantitatively. For instance, in 
assessing the potential outcomes of an environmental effect, there may 
be a limited number of scientific studies with strongly divergent results. 
In such cases, you might present results from a range of plausible 
scenarios, together with any available information that might help in 
qualitatively determining which scenario is most likely to occur. 
OMB Circular A-43 
 
I. In Brief 
For regulators, what is the appropriate approach to worst-case scenarios? 
In the face of a pandemic, threatening to produce numerous deaths, should 
costly preventive measures be undertaken, even if the benefits are challenging 
or speculative to quantify? Or suppose that genetically modified foods pose a 
risk of catastrophe—very small, but not zero.4 Or suppose that some new 
 
1. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1933). 
2. See JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING TECHNICAL CHANGE: A CASE STUDY IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 199 (1983). 
3. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CIRCULAR A-4 
(2003), https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/OMB%20Circular%20No.%20A-
4_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/DE4M-5FBV] [hereinafter CIRCULAR A-4]. 
4. For one view, see Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al., The Precautionary Principle (with 
Application to the Genetic Modification of Organisms) (Sept. 4, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), 
http://www.fooledbyrandomness.com/pp2.pdf [https://perma.cc/322V-H9ME], and in particular id. at 
11:  
A lack of observations of explicit harm does not show absence of hidden risks. Current models 
of complex systems only contain the subset of reality that is accessible to the scientist. Nature 
is much richer than any model of it. To expose an entire system to something whose potential 
harm is not understood because extant models do not predict a negative outcome is not 
justifiable; the relevant variables may not have been adequately identified. 
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technology poses a catastrophic risk, but that experts cannot say whether it is 
very small, very large, or somewhere in between.5 Should regulators ban that 
technology? Should the social cost of carbon, designed to capture the damage 
from a ton of carbon emissions, reflect worst-case scenarios, and if so, exactly 
how?6 
With a focus on regulatory policy, my goal here is to answer these 
questions. I will, above all, be attempting to carve out space for the maximin 
rule, which calls for choosing the approach that eliminates the worst of the 
worst-case scenarios. That rule has been subject to formidable objections, 
especially within economics, and I will be acknowledging and attempting to 
fortify those objections here. Nonetheless, my main aim is to show that the 
maximin rule deserves a place in regulatory policy. I shall attempt to specify 
the circumstances in which it deserves that place. Much of the discussion will 
be abstract, but I shall ultimately suggest a specific addition to OMB Circular 
A-4,7 the general framework for undertaking regulatory impact analysis; the 
goal of the addition is to codify a potential application of the maximin rule. 
In extreme situations, regulators of diverse kinds must decide what kinds 
of restrictions to put in place against low-probability risks of catastrophe, or 
against risks that have terrible worst-case scenarios, but to which probabilities 
cannot readily be assigned. Some people, of course, favor quantitative cost-
benefit analysis, whereas others favor some kind of precautionary principle. I 
am going to be embracing the former here, at least as a general rule, but the 
claims that deserve emphasis involve the exceptions, which call for 
precautionary thinking in general and for the maximin rule in particular. 
I will be covering a great deal of ground, and while the journey is more 
important than the destination, it will be useful to specify the basic conclusions 
at the outset. The first three are straightforward. The remaining three are not. 
(1) Regulators should generally focus on expected value and on likely costs 
and benefits, not on worst cases.8 They should aim to come up with 
probability distributions, accompanied by point estimates.9 When they 
cannot produce probability distributions, they should try to come up with 
reasonable ranges of both costs and benefits. 
 
5. Henry A. Kissinger, How the Enlightenment Ends, ATLANTIC (June 2018), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2018/06/henry-kissinger-ai-could-mean-the-end-of-
human-history/559124 [https://perma.cc/YB2F-PBBY]. 
6. Social Cost of Greenhouse Gases, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF 
THE PRESIDENT, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/omb/oira/social-cost-of-carbon 
[https://perma.cc/NB7S-BRGG]. 
7. CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 3. 
8. I am bracketing the various problems with cost-benefit analysis, including the 
priority of welfare and the relevance of distributional considerations. See MATTHEW ADLER, 
MEASURING SOCIAL WELFARE (2019); CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT REVOLUTION (2017). 
9. Point estimates, frequently provided by agencies, can often be understood as 
reflecting the mean of a probability distribution.  
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(2) In some cases, the worst-cases are sufficiently bad, and sufficiently 
probable, that it may make sense to eliminate them, simply in terms of 
conventional cost-benefit analysis.10 (That idea appears to have informed 
the aggressive responses to the coronavirus pandemic in 2020.11) 
(3) In some cases, the worst-case outcomes are highly improbable, but they 
are so bad that it may make sense to eliminate them under conventional 
cost-benefit analysis. (That is a reasonable view about costly efforts to 
reduce the risk of a financial crisis.12) 
(4) In some circumstances, involving what is often described as Knightian 
uncertainty, observers (including regulators) cannot assign probabilities 
to imaginable outcomes, and the maximin rule is appealing for that 
reason. I will argue that, contrary to a vigorously defended view in 
economics,13 the problem of uncertainty is real and sometimes important. 
(5) In some cases, a probability distribution might include “fat tails” on the 
left-hand side, in which the probability of extreme, very bad events is 
higher than normal; it might make sense to eliminate those very bad 
outcomes under conventional cost-benefit analysis. The fact that 
complex systems are involved might be important here; interactions 
among people or components of such systems might produce 
unanticipatedly bad results, as in the case of a pandemic. 
(6) With respect to (4) and (5), the problems arise when efforts to eliminate 
dangers, including regulation, would also impose very high costs or 
eliminate very large potential gains. There might be fat tails on the right-
hand side, suggesting the possibility of wonders or miracles, which 
might make human life immeasurably better,14 and which might be 
eliminated by aggressive regulation. 
This is a long and complicated list, so let us simplify it. In general, 
agencies should attempt to maximize social welfare (bracketing complex 
questions about what exactly that means).15 To do that, they should calculate 
costs and benefits, with probability distributions as feasible and appropriate, 
 
10. There is also the question of reversibility, which may greatly matter to the cost-
benefit analysis. The problem is discussed in Cass R. Sunstein, Irreparability as Irreversibility, 2017 
SUP. CT. REV. 93. I bracket that issue here.  
11. See Michael Greenstone & Vishan Nigam, Does Social Distancing Matter? (Univ. 
of Chi., Becker Friedman Inst. for Econ. Working Paper No. 2020-26, 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3561244 [https://perma.cc/LT4K-TCVK]. 
12. See Eric A. Posner & E. Glen Weyl, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Financial 
Regulations: A Response to Criticisms, 124 YALE L.J.F. 246 (2015). 
13. An early account is FRANK RAMSEY, Truth and Probability, in THE FOUNDATIONS 
OF MATHEMATICS AND OTHER LOGICAL ESSAYS (R. B. Braithwaite ed., 1931). A vigorous defense of 
the importance and pervasiveness of Knightian uncertainty is JOHN KAY & MERVYN KING, RADICAL 
UNCERTAINTY: DECISION-MAKING BEYOND THE NUMBERS 35–49, 106–30 (2020). I agree with Kay and 
King on the question of importance but not quite on the issue of pervasiveness, for reasons explored 
below. 
14. Arden Rowell, Regulating Best-Case Scenarios, 50 ENV. L. (forthcoming 2020), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3157287 [https://perma.cc/ZDX4-9D7Y]. 
15. See ADLER, supra note 8. 
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and they should proceed if and only if the benefits justify the costs.16 They 
should not focus solely or mostly on the worst cases; they should not give them 
more weight than other cases (bracketing for now risk aversion or loss 
aversion, to which I shall turn in due course). At the same time, calculation of 
costs and benefits may not be feasible, and an important question remains: are 
there any problems that the maximin rule can handle better than welfare 
maximization? The simplest answer points to cases of Knightian uncertainty, 
where probabilities cannot be assigned. 
As we shall also see, the maximin rule is especially appealing when the 
costs of eliminating the worst-case scenario are not terribly high, and when the 
worst-case scenario is genuinely grave. For reasons to be explained, we can see 
the simplest such cases as involving “negative freerolls,” which are best 
avoided. The argument for use of the maximin rule grows stronger as the 
badness of the worst-case scenario increases. It grows weaker as the costs of 
eliminating the worst-case scenario rise, and as that scenario becomes 
decreasingly grave.17 
II. With and Without Numbers 
Imagine that you have a heart condition but that you would like to 
continue doing strenuous exercise. You ask your doctor for advice, and she 
says that you probably should not, pointing to the risk of some kind of heart 
damage, which would in turn increase the risk of a stroke or a heart attack. 
Suppose that you ask her to assign probabilities to the range of possibilities, 
from “no adverse health effects at all” to “death.” Suppose that she says, 
“Okay, you’ve got me. The likelihood of no adverse health effects is very 
high—maybe 99%. The likelihood of a significant increase in risk is in the 
vicinity of 1%, probably less. The likelihood of death, as a result of the 
strenuous exercise that you propose, is trivially small.” 
Under such circumstances, you may or may not continue doing strenuous 
exercise. An important question is how much you like doing it. You might want 
to weigh the hedonic and other benefits of strenuous exercise against the very 
small chance of significantly increasing your health risks. The outcome of that 
weighing will depend on your preferences—on what you care about. If you do 
not care much about strenuous exercise, you might decide, on precautionary 
grounds, to stop doing it. If the exercise is something that much matters to you, 
you might continue. Things might get more complicated if your doctor adds, 
 
16. This claim is meant to be less rigid than it sounds. It should be taken as a 
presumption rather than a rule. Distributive considerations, or welfarist considerations, might trump the 
cost-benefit analysis. See MATTHEW ADLER, WELFARE AND FAIR DISTRIBUTION (2011). There may also 
be a legitimate role for risk aversion of certain kinds. 
17. I am bracketing a possible institutional defense of the maximin rule, which is that 
it is a defense against some systematic bias on the part of regulators, such as undue optimism or short-
term thinking. If regulators are systematically biased, the maximin rule might plausibly be a corrective. 
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parenthetically, that if you continue to exercise, there is a small chance that you 
will get significant health benefits and thus reduce the risk of death. 
Now suppose instead that after you ask her to assign probabilities to the 
various outcomes, she says, “I can’t do that! No doctor can. For you, we just 
don’t know enough about the likelihood of any of the outcomes, including the 
bad ones.” What should you do? The doctor might be understood to say that 
this is a situation of Knightian uncertainty,18 in which probabilities cannot be 
assigned to various outcomes. Under such circumstances, some people would 
be drawn to the maximin rule: an approach that eliminates the worst-case 
scenario. With respect to pandemics, climate change, and regulation of new 
technologies, the same might be true. At least when some risk or technology 
has a terrible or catastrophic worst-case scenario, the best course might be to 
avoid it. 
To understand what the doctor is saying in these cases, and the regulatory 
problem, we have to understand what it means to assign or to refuse to assign 
probabilities to future events. If the doctor refuses to do that, the simplest 
reason is that she lacks enough information. She might have a frequentist 
understanding of probability, in accordance with which she normally asks: in a 
large number of cases like this, how many times are there adverse health 
effects? This is the kind of question that someone might ask in assigning a 
probability to a fair coin coming up heads on fifty tosses, or a particular baby, 
born in Jerusalem on August 29, turning out to be female. When a doctor or 
regulator refuses to assign probabilities, the reason might be that she is a 
frequentist, and she might not have the kinds of information that frequentists 
require.19 
An alternative understanding of probability judgments is Bayesian, and it 
does not depend on knowledge of frequencies.20 It can be used for singular or 
unique cases.21 Bayesian approaches might be used when someone says that the 
probability of a pandemic five years from now is under 2%, that the probability 
that the Democratic nominee for president will win is 50%, or that the 
probability of a particular set of outcomes in 2100, as a result of climate 
 
18. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (1933); see also R. DUNCAN 
LUCE & HOWARD RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 275–86 (1957). 
19. For a vigorous defense of frequentism as the only plausible foundation of 
probability judgments, see KAY & KING, supra note 13, at 57-68, 110-22. See also Gerd Gigerenzer, 
How to Make Cognitive Illusions Disappear: Beyond “Heuristics and Biases,” 2 EUR. REV. SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 83 (1991); Gerd Gigerenzer, Why the Distinction Between Single-Event Probabilities and 
Frequencies Is Important for Psychology (and Vice Versa), in SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY 129, 129–61 
(George Wright & Peter Ayton eds., 1994).  
20. Eric-Jan Wagenmakers et al., Bayesian Versus Frequentist Inference, in 
BAYESIAN EVALUATION OF INFORMATIVE HYPOTHESES 181 (Herbert Hoijtink et al. eds., 2008). 
21. For a brisk, illuminating notation, see Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, On the 
Reality of Cognitive Illusions, 103 PSYCHOL. REV. 582, 586 (1996). 
Whether or not it is meaningful to assign a definite numerical value to the probability of 
survival of a specific individual, we submit (a) that this individual is less likely to die within a 
week than to die within a year and (b) that most people regard the preceding statement as 
true—not as meaningless—and treat its negation as an error or a fallacy. 
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change, is over 90%. Bayesians start with a prior probability and then update 
on the basis of what they learn. Unlike frequentists, they are willing to assign 
probabilities to singular or nonrepeatable events. At the same time, a Bayesian 
doctor or regulator might agree that in a particular case, any subjective 
probability that she assigns to an event is speculative in the extreme; she might 
acknowledge that she lacks sufficient information to have any confidence in it. 
For that reason, she might agree that the situation is one of Knightian 
uncertainty. 
It is important to note that frequentists believe that for unique or 
nonrepeatable events, assignments of probability are essentially meaningless.22 
In their view, we have no basis for assigning a probability when we lack a 
frequency distribution. To say that a particular Democratic nominee has a 50% 
chance of being president, or that climate change is 90% likely to cause 
specified damage by 2100, is to speak nonsense, unless either statement can be 
plausibly justified in frequentist terms. For frequentists, the problem of 
Knightian uncertainty is therefore pervasive; it exists whenever we are dealing 
with a unique or nonrepeating problem, and we are doing that much of the 
time.23 In my view, frequentists are unconvincing on that count, but it is not 
necessary to defend that conclusion for present purposes. Bayesians should also 
be willing to agree that Knightian uncertainty exists (a point to which I will 
return). 
Consider in this regard a document from the White House, Principles for 
Regulation and Oversight of Emerging Technologies, issued in 2011 and still in 
effect.24 In general, the document embraces cost-benefit analysis, but in a 
puzzlingly qualified way: “Benefits and costs: Federal regulation and oversight 
of emerging technologies should be based on an awareness of the potential 
benefits and the potential costs of such regulation and oversight, including 
recognition of the role of limited information and risk in decision making.”25 
What, exactly, is the role of “limited information”? What is the role of “risk”? 
With respect to regulation, the document explicitly calls out the problem of 
uncertainty: “The benefits of regulation should justify the costs (to the extent 
permitted by law and recognizing the relevance of uncertainty and the limits of 
quantification and monetary equivalents).” 
The two sentences are different. The first refers to limited information and 
risk. The second refers to uncertainty and the limits of quantification. But with 
 
22. See KAY & KING, supra note 13, at 74-84. 
23. See id. 
24. Memorandum from John P. Holdren, Assistant to the President for Sci. & Tech. 
Dir., Office of Sci. & Tech. Policy, Cass R. Sunstein, Admin., Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, 
Office of Mgmt. & Budget & Islam A. Siddiqui, Chief Agric. Negotiator, U.S. Trade Representative on 
Principles for Regulation and Oversight of Emerging Technologies to Heads of Exec. Dept’s & 




09. SUNSTEIN ARTICLE. FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2020 8:02 PM 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:940 2020 
948 
respect to some problems, including those potentially raised by pandemics, 
climate change, and emerging technologies, we should understand the 
document, taken as a whole, to be emphasizing the epistemic limits of 
policymakers and regulators, and also to be drawing attention to the problem of 
Knightian uncertainty. These limits, and that problem, can be seen as 
qualifications to the general idea, pervasive in federal regulation, that regulators 
should proceed only if the benefits justify the costs.26 OMB Circular A-4, a 
kind of Bible for federal regulatory analysis, explicitly recognizes both 
epistemic limits and Knightian uncertainty, and offers a plea for developing 
probability distributions to the extent feasible.27 But what if it is not feasible to 
produce probability distributions, either because we lack frequencies or because 
Bayesian approaches cannot come up with them? 
For a glimpse at the problem, consider a few numbers from cost-benefit 
reports from the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs.  
(1) The projected annual benefits from an air pollution rule governing 
motor vehicles range from $3.9 billion to $12.9 billion.28 
(2) The projected annual benefits of an air pollution rule governing 
particulate matter range from $3.6 billion to $9.1 billion.29 
(3) The projected benefits of a regulation governing hazardous air 
pollutants range from $28.1 billion to $76.9 billion.30  
(4) The projected benefits of a regulation governing cross-state air pollution 
range from $20.5 billion to $59.7 billion.31 
 
26. See Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review, 3 C.F.R. § 13563 (2020). 
27. See CIRCULAR A-4, supra note 3, at 41. The relevant passage is worth quoting at 
length:  
Whenever possible, you should use appropriate statistical techniques to determine a 
probability distribution of the relevant outcomes. For rules that exceed the $1 billion annual 
threshold, a formal quantitative analysis of uncertainty is required. For rules with annual 
benefits and/or costs in the range from 100 million to $1 billion, you should seek to use more 
rigorous approaches with higher consequence rules. This is especially the case where net 
benefits are close to zero. More rigorous uncertainty analysis may not be necessary for rules in 
this category if simpler techniques are sufficient to show robustness. 
28. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2015 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS AND AGENCY COMPLIANCE WITH THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT 25 (2015), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/2015_cb/2015-cost-benefit-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2RA-687U] [hereinafter 2015 Report]. 
29. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2014 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 25 (2014), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/2014_cb/2014-cost-benefit-
report.pdf [https://perma.cc/H5US-8UJS] [hereinafter 2014 Report].  
30. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 27 (2013), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/inforeg/inforeg/2013_cb/2013_cost_benefit
_report-updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/27AJ-EJ9C].  
31. OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. 
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 2013 REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF FEDERAL 
REGULATIONS AND UNFUNDED MANDATES ON STATE, LOCAL, AND TRIBAL ENTITIES 26 (2012), 
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It is worth pausing over three noteworthy features of these numbers. First, 
the government does not offer probability estimates to make sense of these 
ranges. It does not say that the probability at the low end is 1%, or 25%, or 
50%. The default implication may be that the probability distribution is normal, 
so long as it is not specified, which might mean that the point forecast is the 
mean of the upper and lower bound. But is that what really is meant? Second, 
the ranges are exceptionally wide. In all four cases, the difference between the 
floor and the ceiling is much higher than the floor (which is in the billions of 
dollars)! Third, the wide ranges suggest that the worst-case scenario from 
government inaction, understood as a refusal to regulate, is massively worse 
than the best-case scenario. If regulators focus on the worst-case scenario, the 
relevant regulation is amply justified in all of these cases; there is nothing to 
discuss. The matter becomes more complicated if regulators focus on the best-
case scenario or on the midpoint. But where should they focus? 
All of these examples involve air pollution regulation, where projection of 
health benefits depends on significantly different models, leading to radically 
different estimates.32 But even outside of that context, relatively standard 
regulations, not involving new technologies, often project wide ranges in terms 
of benefits, costs, or both.33 In terms of monetized costs, the worst case may be 
double the best case.34 In terms of monetized benefits, the best case may be 
triple the worst case.35 For a more general glimpse, consider this table, with 





32. See 2015 Report, supra note 28, at 13-18. 
33. See id. at 19.  
34. See id. (food safety rules).  
35. See id.  
36. See 2014 Report, supra note 29. 
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Table 1. Estimates of Annual Benefits and Costs of Non-Environmental 
Related Health and Safety Rules: October 1, 2003 - September 30, 2013  
(billions of 2001 and 2010 dollars) 
 





Estimated Benefits Estimated Costs 
2001$ 2010$ 2001$ 2010$ 























































Some of these gaps are very big, but for pandemics and new technologies, 
the difference between the worst and the best case might be (much) bigger 
still.37 It is also important to emphasize that new or emerging technologies may 
be or include “moonshots,” understood as low-probability (or uncertain 
probability) outcomes with extraordinarily high benefits; call them miracles. 
Regulation might prevent those miracles,38 or make them far less likely. In this 
domain, we may have “catastrophe-miracle” tradeoffs. 
Because of its relevance to regulation of emerging technologies, I focus 
throughout on the difference between risk and uncertainty and urge that in the 
context of risk, adoption of the maximin rule is usually (not always) a 
fundamental mistake. Everything depends on the particular numbers, but in 
general, I aim to bury that rule, not to praise it. At the same time, I suggest that 
it deserves serious attention under identifiable conditions. When regulators 
 
37. As an analogy, consider the social cost of carbon, with a range, in 2020 dollars, 
from $12 to $123 per ton. INTERAGENCY WORKING GROUP ON SOCIAL COST OF GREENHOUSE GASES, 
U.S. GOV’T, TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT: TECHNICAL UPDATE OF THE SOCIAL COST OF CARBON 
FOR REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS UNDER EXECUTIVE ORDER 12866 (Aug. 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/omb/inforeg/scc_tsd_final_clean_8_26_16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/7URZ-MBFH]. 
38. Rowell, supra note 14. 
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really are unable to assign probabilities to outcomes, and when some possible 
outcomes are catastrophic, the maximin rule has considerable appeal. Climate 
change is an obvious candidate for this conclusion,39 and something similar 
might be said for some pandemics and other new or emerging risks, including 
some that are not even on the horizon.40 But a great deal depends on what is 
lost by adopting the maximin rule. As we will see, catastrophic risks—of low 
or uncertain probability—may accompany both regulation and nonregulation. 
In addition, adoption of the maximin rule may rule out the possibility of 
miracles. 
III. Risk and Risk Aversion 
Does it generally make sense to eliminate the worst-case scenario? Put the 
question of uncertainty to one side and begin with numerical examples that 
involve risk instead. My topic is regulation, of course, but to make conceptual 
progress on that problem, it will be useful to provide stylized cases involving 
monetary gambles, which have the advantage of stripping away possible 
complications. 
A. Numbers 
 Problem 1. 
 Which would you prefer? 
(a)  A 99.9% chance of gaining $10,000, and a 0.1% chance of losing $6; 
or 
(b) A 50% chance of gaining $5, and a 50% chance of losing $5. 
 
Under maximin, (b) is preferable, but under standard accounts of 
rationality, it would be much more sensible to select (a), which has a far higher 
expected value (outcome multiplied by probability). To choose (b), one would 
have to show an extraordinary degree of risk aversion. 
 
Problem 2. 
Which would you prefer? 
(a)A 70% chance of gaining $100, and a 30% chance of losing $30; or 
(b)A 50% chance of gaining $10, and a 50% chance of losing $10. 
 
 
39. See STEPHEN M. GARDNER, A PERFECT MORAL STORM: THE ETHICAL TRAGEDY 
OF CLIMATE CHANGE 411-14 (2011). 
40. Broadly related arguments, emphasizing worst-cases and low-probability risks of 
catastrophe, can be found in Martin L. Weitzman, Fat Tails and the Social Cost of Carbon, 104 AM. 
ECON. REV. 544 (2014); Martin L. Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty in the Economics of Catastrophic 
Climate Change, 5 REV. ENVTL. ECON. & POL. 275 (2011) [hereinafter Weitzman, Fat-Tailed 
Uncertainty]; and Martin L. Weitzman, On Modeling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic 
Climate Change, 91 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1 (2009). 
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Under maximin, (b) is again preferable, but under standard accounts of 
rationality, it would still be much more sensible to select (a), which has a much 
higher expected value. We could easily proliferate examples in which the 
magnitude of risk aversion required to justify selection of (b) would be steadily 
reduced. For example: 
 
Problem 3. 
Which would you prefer? 
(a)A 60% chance of gaining $60, and a 40% chance of losing $40; or 
(b)A 50% chance of gaining $10, and a 50% chance of losing $10. 
 
Here again, (a) has higher expected value, but it is less obvious that a 
chooser should choose it, at least if this is the only gamble that she will be 
offered (a point to which I will return), and at least if the welfare loss of losing 
$40 is serious, even though the monetary figure is not so high.41 Examples of 
this kind can be mapped onto regulatory problems. For example, a decision to 
mandate widespread use of some new technology (say, electric cars) might take 
the form of Problem 2, where (a) is a mandate and (b) is no mandate. This 
could be so if we are not sure about the social costs and social benefits of such 
a mandate. Similarly, a decision to allow widespread use of some new 
technology (say, artificial intelligence in cancer treatment) might take the form 
of Problem 3, where (a) is widespread use and (b) is nonadoption. This could 
be so if the reliability of the new technology is not clear. 
In life or in public policy, is risk aversion irrational? If one is making a 
very large number of monetary bets, it certainly is. If you had 10,000 questions 
like those immediately above, you should almost certainly choose (a). No 
gambler will do well if she keeps choosing (b).42 But in some circumstances, 
the answer is less obvious. Suppose that a seventy-year-old investor, Smith, is 
not in the best of health, and is deciding between two strategies for his pension. 
The first, called Caution, creates a 50% chance of no gain (aside from keeping 
up with inflation) and a 50% chance of an annual gain of 2%. The second, 
called Risky, creates a 25% chance of an annual loss of 5%, a 25% chance of 
no gain (aside from keeping up with inflation), a 25% chance of a 5% annual 
gain, and a 25% chance of a 10% annual gain. 
In terms of expected value, Risky is much better. But without knowing 
about the effects of these outcomes on the chooser’s welfare, it is hard to know 
which Smith should choose. There is the matter of worry: would Risky cause 
fear and sleeplessness? Then there is the matter of economics: how much 
 
41. See KAY & KING, supra note 13, at 114-16. 
42. For a superb discussion, with many implications for policy, see ANNIE DUKE, 
THINKING IN BETS (2018). I should note that for any gambler, the first bet must be made with an 
adequate bankroll, which means that a gambler would choose (a) only assuming that she had that. 
(Thanks to Annie Duke for this qualification.) 
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would a 5% loss matter to Smith? What would be the effect of a 5% gain? 
Perhaps a 5% loss would be devastating, given Smith’s needs and wants, and 
perhaps a 5% gain would not much matter. Whether risk aversion is rational 
depends on the answer to these questions. The monetary figures are 
insufficient, because they do not tell us about the effects on Smith’s welfare. 
The analysis is similar to the heart disease example with which I began. 
Something similar might be true in the regulatory context; we need to know 
what the gains and the losses actually mean, in terms of welfare. 
And what happens if the worst cases are catastrophically bad? 
 
Problem 4. 
Which would you prefer? 
(a)A 99.99% chance of gaining $60, and a 0.01% chance of losing $100 
million (resulting in a negative expected value); or 
(b)A 50% chance of gaining $10, and a 50% chance of losing $10. 
 
Even if we know everything we need to know, (b) is better, at least in 
terms of expected value. The example shows that a low-probability risk of 
catastrophe can drive the outcome of cost-benefit analysis, even if the 
probability is low indeed, and even if we put risk aversion to one side. Calling 
attention to “fat tails,” Martin Weitzman has emphasized something like this 
point in the context of climate change.43 The problem of fat tails is not captured 
in Problem 4; fat tails consist of unusual probability distributions, when the 
likelihood of bad outcomes is unusually high at the extremes, including cases in 




Which would you prefer? 
(a)A 99% chance of gaining $60, a 0.01% chance of losing $10, and a 
0.09% chance of losing $100 million; or 
(b)A 50% chance of gaining $10, and a 50% chance of losing $10. 
 
Problem 5 involves a very fat tail (on the left), and (b) is better on cost-
benefit grounds. Whether we are dealing with low-probability risks of 
catastrophe or fat tails, the magnitude of the potential harm can call for serious 
caution. The point may apply to many problems, including that of pandemics 
and risky technologies. (In such cases, the fact that we are dealing with 
complex systems, and unpredictability about how they will work, may be 
exceptionally important. Observers might not foresee what kinds of outcomes 
will be produced by interactions among component parts, or among people, as 
 
43. See Weitzman, Fat-Tailed Uncertainty, supra note 40.  
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in the case of exponential growth in illness and death during a pandemic.) 
Consider Weitzman’s important suggestion, focusing on climate change: 
Deep structural uncertainty about the unknown unknowns of what might go very 
wrong is coupled with essentially unlimited downside liability on possible 
planetary damages. This is a recipe for producing what are called “fat tails” in 
the extremes of critical probability distributions. There is a race being run in the 
extreme tail between how rapidly probabilities are declining and how rapidly 
damages are increasing. Who wins this race, and by how much, depends on how 
fat (with probability mass) the extreme tails are. It is difficult to judge how fat 
the tail of catastrophic climate change might be because it represents events that 
are very far outside the realm of ordinary experience.44 
In this passage, Weitzman combines an emphasis on “the unknown 
unknowns,” or uncertainty, with a reference to “the extremes of probability 
distributions.”45 Problems 4 and 5 do not involve uncertainty. They point only 
to extreme outcomes, which can be enough to dominate the comparison of 
expected values. These, then, are cases in which the maximin rule might be 
justified on the ground that it does not conflict with what would emerge from 
an analysis of expected value; because of the sheer magnitude of the harm in 
the worst-case scenario, it has outsized importance in the judgment about what 
to do. (To be sure, risk-seeking choosers might take their chances with (a).) As 
I have noted, this might be the right analysis of certain pandemics, especially 
when we emphasize the possibility (probability?) of exponential growth in 
infections and deaths. 
Note, however, that in some cases, variations on Problem 4 are imaginable 
and illuminating. For example: 
 
Problem 6. 
Which would you prefer? 
(a)A 99.99% chance of gaining $60, and a 0.01% chance of losing $100 
million; or 
(b)A 49.99% chance of gaining $10, a 50% chance of losing $10, and a 
0.01% chance of losing $100 million. 
 
Problem 6 shows that low-probability, high-magnitude outcomes might 
accompany both options. On one view (with admittedly contested 
assumptions), climate change is an example. Immediate, very costly steps 
might be necessary to avert catastrophic risks, but they might themselves 
impose catastrophic risks, if (for example) they might threaten to create some 
massive economic downturn and geopolitical instability. (We could easily alter 
 
44. Id. at 275. 
45. See also id. at 285 (“The result of this lengthy cascading of big uncertainties is a 
reduced form of truly extraordinary uncertainty about the aggregate welfare impacts of catastrophic 
climate change, which is represented mathematically by a PDF that is spread out and heavy with 
probability in the tails.”). 
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Problems 5 and 6 so as to include uncertainty.) With respect to new or 
emerging technologies, of course, there may be potentially massive upsides as 
well as potentially catastrophic downsides. Artificial intelligence and machine 
learning are possible examples.46 In that regard, consider this: 
 
Problem 7. 
(a)A 51% chance of gaining $60, and a 49% chance of losing $1; or 
(b)A 49.99% chance of gaining $10, a 50% chance of losing $10, and a 
0.01% chance of gaining $100 million. 
 
This is a problem of “moonshots” or “miracles,” understood as low-
probability chances of extraordinary returns.47 We can also imagine “fat 
heads,” parallel to fat tails, or more properly, fat tails on both sides of the 
probability distribution. Here again, Problem 7 could be altered so as to include 
uncertainty. If the magnitude of those returns is high enough, they can dwarf 
the calculation of expected value. On standard grounds, maximax (maximize 
the best-case scenario) would be the right decision rule. We could also imagine 
cases in which an option has a negative expected value, but in which the 
moonshot is nonetheless a reasonable gamble. And if (b) in Problem 7 is 
combined with (a) in Problem 4, we will face “catastrophe-miracle” tradeoffs, 
here in circumstances of risk. (With uncertainty, the analytical challenge is 
even harder, though if catastrophes are bad enough—say, extinction—they may 
justifiably loom larger than miracles.) 
What about the option of inaction? Every one of the foregoing problems 
could be understood to include inaction as one of the two options, producing 
one of the relevant payoffs, or could be designed so as explicitly to include that 
option. A simple example, where (b) is understood to mean inaction: 
 
Problem 8. 
Which would you prefer? 
(a)A 50% chance of gaining $1.5 million, and a 50% chance of losing $1 
million; or 
(b)A 50% chance of no change from the status quo, and a 50% chance of 
losing $500,000 from the status quo. 
 
In terms of expected value, (a) is better. But in a one-shot gamble, the right 
choice might not be so clear. One more time: for individuals, a gain of $1.5 
million may produce less welfare than would be lost by a loss of $500,000. 
There is a difference between expected value and expected utility (or welfare). 
 
46. See Sendhil Mullainathan and Jann Spiess, Machine Learning: An Applied 
Econometric Approach, 31 J. ECON. PERSP. 87, 98-104 (2017). 
47. Rowell, supra note 14. 
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Once we transform money into welfare, (b) might start to look more attractive, 
even if we put loss aversion (taken up shortly) to one side. 
Consider one more case, attempting to broaden the viewscreen: 
 
Problem 9. 
Which would you prefer? 
(a)A 50% chance of losing $100 million, and a 50% chance of losing $200 
million; or 
(b)An 80% chance of losing $50 million and a 20% chance of losing $90 
million. 
 
Option (b) is obviously better, though both are bad. (I am understanding 
the numbers as net losses, compared to the status quo.) We need not speak of 
the maximin rule in order to reach that conclusion. In 2020, the coronavirus 
pandemic could easily have been analyzed in terms of Problem 9, with 
aggressive responses producing (b), and much less aggressive responses 
producing (a).48 Problem 9 is instructive because it shows that when aggressive 
regulation and nonregulation (understood to include weak regulation) both 
impose significant and even catastrophic net losses, an understanding of 
standard cost-benefit analysis can call for aggressive regulation. 
B. Precautions and Risk 
What is the appropriate role of risk aversion in the regulatory context? 
Should regulators focus on worst-case scenarios? Should they adopt the 
maximin rule?49 When? 
For certain regulatory problems, many people accept the Precautionary 
Principle.50 The idea takes multiple forms, some far more cautious and targeted 
than others,51 but it is often understood to embody a commitment to risk 
aversion. The central idea is that regulators should take aggressive action to 
avoid certain risks, even if they do not know that those risks will come to 
fruition. Suppose, for example, that there is some probability that genetic 
modification of food will produce serious environmental harm.52 
 
48. Greenstone & Nigam, supra note 11. 
49. An influential paper, suggesting the rationality of either maximin or maximax 
(maximize the best-case scenario), is Kenneth Arrow & L. Hurwicz, An Optimality Criterion for 
Decision-Making Under Uncertainty, in UNCERTAINTY AND EXPECTATION IN ECONOMICS 1 (C.F. 
Carter & J.L. Ford eds., 1972).  
50. For general discussion, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR (2006). 
51. See Taleb et al., supra note 4. 
52. Id. Taleb et al. focus on “propagating impacts resulting in irreversible and 
widespread damage.” Id. at 1. In their understanding, the Precautionary Principle is designed “to avoid a 
certain class of what, in probability and insurance, is called ‘ruin’ problems. A ruin problem is one 
where outcomes of risks have a non-zero probability of resulting in unrecoverable losses.” Id. at 2. 
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For those who embrace the Precautionary Principle, it is important to take 
precautions against potentially serious hazards, simply because it is better to be 
safe than sorry. Thus, for example, the 1992 Rio Declaration states, “Where 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to 
prevent environmental degradation.”53 The Wingspread Declaration goes 
somewhat further: “When an activity raises threats of harm to human health or 
the environment, precautionary measures should be taken even if some cause 
and effect relationships are not fully established scientifically. In this context 
the proponent of an activity, rather than the public, should bear the burden of 
proof.”54 
Whatever the preferred formulation, the Precautionary Principle can be 
seen as an effort to build in a kind of margin of safety, perhaps because of “a 
clear normative presumption in favour of particular values or qualities—for 
instance concerning [the] environment or human health. This is instead of (for 
example) economic, sectoral, or partisan institutional interests.”55 In certain 
forms, the principle might be taken to reflect the maximin principle: rule out 
the worst of the worst-case scenarios. But insofar as we are speaking about risk 
aversion in general, the Precautionary Principle runs into a serious objection: 
risks may be on all sides of social situations. Regulators are often dealing with 
risk-risk tradeoffs or even health-health tradeoffs.56 When this is so, it is not 
helpful to speak of “a clear normative presumption in favour of . . . human 
health,” because human health is at risk whatever choice regulators make.57 
Suppose, for example, that steps are taken to regulate or ban genetically 
modified food on precautionary grounds.58 Many people believe that any such 
steps might well result in numerous deaths, and a small probability of many 
more.59 The reason is that genetic modification holds out the promise of 
 
53. WINGSPREAD CONFERENCE ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, SCI. & ENVTL. 
HEALTH NETWORK, THE WINGSPREAD STATEMENT ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE (1998) (quoted 
in BJORN LOMBORG, THE SKEPTICAL ENVIRONMENTALIST 347 (2001)). 
54. See The Precautionary Principle, RACHEL’S ENVT. & HEALTH WKLY. (Envtl. Res. 
Found., Annapolis, Md.), Feb. 19, 1998. 
55. See Andrew Stirling, Precaution in the Governance of Technology, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK OF LAW, REGULATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 645, 649 (Roger Brownsword et al. eds., 2017).  
56. See JOHN GRAHAM AND JONATHAN WIENER, RISK VS. RISK (1997). To that extent, 
it is not right to say that “criticism of the precautionary principle” is necessarily or generally rooted “on 
the overtly political grounds that it addresses general concerns like environment and human health, 
rather than more private interests like commercial profit or the fate of a particular kind of technology.” 
Stirling, supra note 55, at 650. The “general concerns” may be on both sides. 
57. See Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996). 
58. See Tony Gilland, Precaution, GM Crops, and Farmland Birds, in RETHINKING 
RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 84, 84-88 (Julian Morris ed., 2001); Are the US and Europe 
Heading for a Food Fight Over Genetically Modified Food?, PEW INITIATIVE FOOD & BIOTECHNOLOGY 
(Oct. 24, 2001), https://web.archive.org/web/20071011163512/http://pewagbiotech.org/events/1024/ 
[https://perma.cc/AAZ4-WLWJ] (archived from the original). 
59. BILL LAMBRECHT, DINNER AT THE NEW GENE CAFE: HOW GENETIC 
ENGINEERING IS CHANGING WHAT WE EAT, HOW WE LIVE, AND THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF FOOD 
(2001) (tracing but not endorsing the various objections). 
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producing food that is both cheaper and healthier—resulting, for example, in 
“golden rice,” which might have large benefits in developing countries.60 The 
point is not that genetic modification will definitely have those benefits, or that 
the benefits of genetic modification outweigh the risks, or that precautions are a 
bad idea. The point is only that if the Precautionary Principle is taken in certain 
ways, it is offended by regulation as well as by non-regulation. To be sure, the 
maximin principle might prove helpful here, on a certain set of empirical 
assumptions—an issue to which I will return. 
Or consider regulation of autonomous vehicles.61 There is no question that 
such vehicles pose risks to public safety. Some of them crash. At the same 
time, a failure to allow autonomous vehicles, or even to promote them, or 
perhaps even to mandate them, might well be seen to offend the Precautionary 
Principle, because the result would be, with some probability, to cost lives.62 
Use of autonomous vehicles might well increase safety, perhaps dramatically. 
We are dealing with safety-safety tradeoffs. The example shows again that if it 
is understood in a certain way, the principle seems to forbid the very steps that 
it requires. To make progress, it would seem necessary, not to speak of 
precautions or to invoke maximin, but to identify the possible outcomes and to 
specify the probability that they will occur. That will rapidly move us in the 
direction of cost-benefit analysis. But what if important information is absent? 
To see how hard that question might bite, imagine that technical analysts 
inform political officials that if they proceed with a regulation, the monetized 
benefits will have a range of $300 million to $1.5 billion, and that the 
monetized costs will have a range of $200 million to $1.6 billion.63 Suppose 
that the analysts add that they cannot assign probabilities to various points 
within the range. We seem to have not only a risk-risk tradeoff, in the sense 
that risks lie on both sides of the problem, but also an uncertainty-uncertainty 
tradeoff, in the sense that analysts identify outcomes without probabilities on 
both sides.64 Should we say that the agency should not proceed because $1.6 
billion is higher than $1.5 billion? That is hardly clear. 
 
60. Id.  
61. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE OF TRANSPORTATION: 
AUTOMATED VEHICLES 3.0 (AV 3.0) (2018), https://www.transportation.gov/av/3/preparing-future-
transportation-automated-vehicles-3 [https://perma.cc/NVA5-X39J]. 
62. Teena Maddox, How Autonomous Vehicles Could Save Over 350K Lives in the US 
and Millions Worldwide, ZDNET (Feb. 1, 2018), https://www.zdnet.com/article/how-autonomous-
vehicles-could-save-over-350k-lives-in-the-us-and-millions-worldwide [https://perma.cc/AA5R-
BWSZ]. 
63. The example is not so artificial; in the context of genetically modified food, for 
example, the Department of Agriculture projected first-year costs of between $569 million and $3.9 
billion. See National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. 65,814, 65,869 (2020).  
64. Note that the uncertainty is by hypothesis bounded; it is within specific ranges that 
probabilities cannot be assigned.  




Now turn to a mundane illustration of the kinds of decisions in which the 
maximin rule might seem attractive: a reporter, living in Los Angeles, has been 
told that she can take one of two assignments. First, she can go to a nation, say 
Syria, in which conditions are dangerous (perhaps there is a military conflict). 
Second, she can go to Paris to cover anti-American sentiment in France. The 
Syria assignment has, in her view, two polar outcomes: a) she might have the 
most interesting and rewarding experience of her professional life, or b) she 
might be killed. The Paris assignment has two polar outcomes of its own: a) she 
might have an interesting experience, one that is also a great deal of fun, or b) 
she might be lonely and homesick. It might seem tempting for the reporter to 
choose Paris, on the ground that the worst-case scenario for that choice is so 
much better than the worst-case scenario for Syria. To know if this is so, she 
should probably think a bit about probabilities. She might not have numbers, 
but she might know enough to know, roughly, that the chance of being killed in 
Syria is quite small, but higher than in Paris, and that she would worry about 
that risk while in Syria. These points might incline her, reasonably enough, to 
choose Paris. And if this is correct, the conclusion might bear on regulatory 
policy, where one or another approach has an identifiably worst worst-case 
scenario.65 To be sure, regulators would want to be more disciplined about both 
outcomes and probabilities. 
But we have seen enough to know that maximin is not always a sensible 
decision rule. Suppose that the reporter now has the choice of staying in Los 
Angeles or going to Paris; suppose too that on personal and professional 
grounds, Paris is far better. It would make little sense for her to invoke 
maximin in order to stay in Los Angeles on the ground that the plane to Paris 
might crash. A plane crash is of course extremely unlikely, but it cannot be 
entirely ruled out. Using an example of this kind, John Harsanyi contends that 
the maximin rule should be rejected on the ground that it produces irrationality, 
even madness: “If you took the maximin principle seriously you could not ever 
cross the street (after all, you might be hit by a car); you could never drive over 
a bridge (after all, it might collapse); you could never get married (after all, it 
might end in a disaster), etc. If anybody really acted in this way he would soon 
end up in a mental institution.”66 
Harsanyi’s argument might also be invoked to contest the use of maximin 
in the choice between Syria and Paris. Perhaps the reporter should attempt to 
specify the likelihood of being killed in Syria, rather than simply identifying 
the worst-case scenario and resting content with intuitive assessments. Perhaps 
 
65. See National Bioengineered Food Disclosure Standard, 83 Fed. Reg. at 65,869; 
Richard T. Woodward & Richard C. Bishop, How to Decide When Experts Disagree: Uncertainty-
Based Choice Rules in Environmental Policy, 73 LAND ECON. 492 (1997). 
66. John C. Harsanyi, Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A 
Critique of John Rawls’ Theory, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 594, 595 (1975). 
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maximin is a way of neglecting probability, and hence a form of irrationality. 
In some circumstances, people do display probability neglect, in a way that 
ensures attention to the worst-case scenario.67 But if probabilities can actually 
be assessed, and if that scenario is extremely unlikely to come to fruition, 
probability neglect is hard to defend even for people who are exceptionally 
risk-averse. Suppose that the risk of death, in Syria, turns out to be 1/1,000,000, 
and that the choice of Syria would be much better, personally and 
professionally, than the choice of Paris. Importantly, it is necessary to know 
something about the reporter’s values and tastes to understand how to resolve 
this problem, but it is certainly plausible to think that the reporter should 
choose Syria rather than make the decision by obsessively fixating on the worst 
that might happen. The Council of Environmental Quality once did but no 
longer requires worst-case analysis; it refuses to do so on the ground that 
extremely speculative and improbable outcomes do not deserve attention.68 So 
far, then, Harsanyi’s criticism of maximin seems on firm ground. 
But return in this light to the Precautionary Principle and notice that 
something important is missing from Harsanyi’s argument and even from the 
reporter’s analysis of the choice between Los Angeles and Paris. Risks, and 
equally bad worst-case scenarios, are on all sides of the hypothesized 
situations. If the reporter stayed in Los Angeles, she might be killed in one way 
or another, and hence the use of maximin does not by itself justify the decision 
to stay in the United States. And contrary to Harsanyi’s argument, the maximin 
rule does not really mean that people should not cross streets, drive over 
bridges, and refuse to marry. The reason is that failing to do those three things 
has worst-case scenarios of its own (including death and disaster). To 
implement the maximin rule, or an injunction to take precautions, it is 
necessary to identify all relevant risks (including both outcomes and 
probabilities), not a subset. 
Nonetheless, the more general objection to the maximin rule holds under 
circumstances of risk. If probabilities can be assigned to the various outcomes, 
it usually does not make sense to follow maximin when the worst case is 
exceptionally improbable and when the alternative option is both much better 
and much more likely. As noted, many people are risk-averse, or averse to 
particular risks, and on welfare grounds, some kinds of risk aversion, or 
aversion to particular risks, might be a good idea for individuals and societies. 
But when probabilities can be assigned, the maximin rule, imposed rigorously, 
seems to require infinite risk aversion.69 
 
67. See Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst-cases, and the Law, 
112 YALE L.J. 61, 62-63 (2002). 
68. See Todd S. Aagaard, A Functional Approach to Risks and Uncertainties Under 
NEPA, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 87 (2012). 
69. See Richard A. Musgrave, Maximin, Uncertainty, and the Leisure Trade-Off, 88 
Q.J. ECON. 625, 626-28 (1974). 
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Compare this choice: (1) have a one-week family vacation in Florida, 
where it would be a great deal of fun, but where there is a 0.0001% chance of 
being killed by a Burmese python, or (2) stay home in Boston, where it would 
be relatively boring. Option (2) avoids (let us stipulate) the worst-case scenario, 
but does it really make sense to reject it for that reason? It follows that the 
reporter would do well to reject maximin and to go to Paris, even if the worst-
case scenario for Paris is worse than that for Los Angeles, if the realistically 
likely outcomes are so much better in Paris. 
These points are not meant to suggest that in order to be rational, the 
reporter must calculate expected values, multiplying imaginable outcomes by 
probability and deciding accordingly. Life is short; people are busy and 
occasionally risk-averse; anxiety and worry are themselves harms, and may 
cause harms; important information might be missing or unavailable; it is far 
from irrational to create a margin of safety to protect against disaster. But if the 
likelihood of a bad outcome is exceptionally small, and if much is to be gained 
by deciding in accordance with expected values, maximin is foolish. It does not 
make sense, as a general rule, to identify the worst-case scenario and to attempt 
to eliminate it. But the problem of uncertainty raises distinctive questions. 
D. OMB Circular A-4 
For regulatory impact analysis in the U.S. government, the key document 
is OMB Circular A-4, finalized in 2003.70 That document offers a detailed 
discussion of how to proceed in the absence of complete information. It 
recognizes that 
the level of scientific uncertainty may be so large that you can only present 
discrete alternative scenarios without assessing the relative likelihood of each 
scenario quantitatively. For instance, in assessing the potential outcomes of an 
environmental effect, there may be a limited number of scientific studies with 
strongly divergent results.71 
It adds that “whenever possible, you should use appropriate statistical 
techniques to determine a probability distribution of the relevant outcomes. For 
rules that exceed the $1 billion annual threshold, a formal quantitative analysis 
of uncertainty is required.”72 
But that analysis might leave gaps, simply because insufficient 
information is available to produce specific numbers. In such cases, Circular A-
4 offers guidance about how to proceed, calling for a “formal probabilistic 
analysis of the relevant uncertainties, possibly using simulation models and/or 
expert judgment.” In such assessments, 
 
70. Circular A-4, supra note 3. A useful primer can be found at OFFICE OF INFO. & 
REGULATORY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, REGULATORY 
IMPACT ANALYSIS: A PRIMER, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/Utilities/circular-a-4_regulatory-
impact-analysis-a-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/9YT8-83FZ] (last visited May 30, 2020). 
71. Circular A-4, supra note 3, at 39. 
72. Id. at 41. 
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expert solicitation is a useful way to fill key gaps in your ability to assess 
uncertainty. In general, experts can be used to quantify the probability 
distributions of key parameters and relationships. These solicitations, combined 
with other sources of data, can be combined in Monte Carlo simulations to 
derive a probability distribution of benefits and costs.73 
Optimistically, Circular A-4 concludes: “You should make a special effort 
to portray the probabilistic results—in graphs and/or tables—clearly and 
meaningfully.”74 
It is safe to say that the ambition of this discussion has not been fulfilled. 
In the context of air pollution rules, which sometimes cost at least $1 billion, a 
formal probabilistic analysis is not usually offered. Instead agencies tend to 
report ranges.75 There might be some pragmatic judgments in the background 
here. Agencies might be thinking that the analysis suggested by Circular A-4 is 
quite demanding, and if the benefits of a rule exceed the costs on any 
reasonable assumptions, the costs of undertaking the analysis might exceed the 
benefits. But without investigating particular problems in detail, we cannot 
know whether that is true. And in some cases, involving new risks and 
emerging technologies, the approach suggested by Circular A-4 might well be 
the right way to go. 
Suppose, for example, that the technical analysis converges on these 
conclusions: The cost of a regulation is $1 billion. The benefits range from 
$800 million to $1.3 billion. The first step would be to see if the benefits range 
could be turned into some kind of point estimate. The second would be to see if 
probabilities could be assigned to various points along the range, perhaps with 
the use of the approaches outlined in OMB Circular A-4. Under the Circular, 
the agency should be pressed to do exactly that. 
E. A Note on Loss Aversion 
People tend to be loss-averse, which means that they view a loss from the 
status quo as more undesirable than an equivalent gain is seen as desirable.76 
When we anticipate a loss of what we now have, we can become genuinely 
afraid, in a way that greatly exceeds our feelings of pleasure when we 
anticipate some (equivalent) supplement to what we now have. So far, perhaps, 
so good. The problem comes when individual and social decisions downplay 
potential gains from the status quo, and fixate on potential losses, in such a way 
as to produce overall increases in risks and overall decreases in well-being. The 
 
73. Id. 
74. Id. at 42. 
75. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text. 
76. See Colin Camerer, Individual Decision Making, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS, 587, 665-670 (John H. Kagel & Alvin E. Roth, eds., 1995); Richard H. 
Thaler, The Psychology of Choice and The Assumptions of Economics, in QUASI-RATIONAL ECONOMICS 
137, 143 (1991) (arguing that “losses loom larger than gains”); Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & 
Richard H. Thaler, Experimental Tests of the Endowment Effect and the Coase Theorem, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 1325, 1328 (1990).  
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problem is heightened by the possibility that loss aversion is an “affective 
forecasting error”—that is, people might think (at the time of decision) that 
losses will have a much greater effect on their well-being than they actually do 
(in experience).77 
In the context of risk regulation, there is a clear implication: people will 
be closely attuned to the losses produced by any newly introduced risk, or by 
any aggravation of existing risks, but far less concerned with the benefits that 
are foregone as a result of regulation. The point very much bears on decisions 
of the Food and Drug Administration, where the risks of allowing unsafe or 
ineffective drugs on the market may be quite visible, while the risks of not 
allowing potentially safe and effective drugs on the market may be hidden. The 
point bears on the introduction of new technologies more generally, where 
regulators might be highly attuned to the risks of allowing them (and imposing 
losses), and less attuned to the risks of forbidding them (and failing to obtain 
gains). More generally, loss aversion often helps to explain what makes the 
Precautionary Principle operational. The opportunity costs of regulation may 
register little or not at all, whereas the threats posed by the activity or substance 
in question may be visible. In fact, this is a form of status-quo bias.78 The status 
quo marks the baseline against which gains and losses are measured, and a loss 
from the status quo seems much worse than a gain from the status quo seems 
good. 
If loss aversion is at work, we would predict that the Precautionary 
Principle would place a spotlight on the losses introduced by some risk and 
downplay the benefits foregone as a result of controls on that risk. Recall the 
emphasis, in the United States, on the risks of insufficient testing of medicines 
as compared with the risks of delaying the availability of those medicines. If 
the “opportunity benefits” are offscreen, the Precautionary Principle will appear 
to give guidance notwithstanding the objections I have made. At the same time, 
the neglected opportunity benefits sometimes present a serious problem with 
the use of the Precautionary Principle. 
Loss aversion is closely associated with another cognitive finding: people 
are far more willing to tolerate familiar risks than unfamiliar ones, even if they 
are statistically equivalent.79 For example, the risks associated with driving do 
not usually occasion a great deal of concern, even though in the United States 
alone, tens of thousands of people die from motor vehicle accidents each year. 
The relevant risks are simply seen as part of life. By contrast, many people are 
quite concerned about risks that appear newer, such as the risks associated with 
genetically modified foods, recently introduced chemicals, and terrorism. Part 
of the reason for the difference may be a belief that with new risks, we are in 
 
77. Deborah A. Kermer et al., Loss Aversion Is an Affective Forecasting Error, 17 
PSYCHOL. SCI. 649 (2006). 
78. See William Samuelson and Richard Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision 
Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7 (1988). 
79. See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 140-43 (2000). 
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the domain of uncertainty (meaning that we cannot assign probabilities to bad 
outcomes) rather than risk (where probabilities can be assigned), and perhaps it 
makes sense to be cautious when we are not able to measure probabilities. But 
the individual and social propensity to focus on new risks outruns that sensible 
propensity. It makes the Precautionary Principle operational by emphasizing a 
subset of the hazards actually involved. 
At first glance, it is tempting to think that if regulators fall prey to loss 
aversion, they will blunder. Consider a situation in which automated vehicles 
will produce twenty-five deaths that would not have occurred, but prevent fifty 
deaths that would have occurred. Unless those numbers conceal other factors, it 
seems clear that automated vehicles should be allowed. That is indeed the right 
result, but if people are loss averse, they might not weight a loss from a new 
technology in the same way that they would weight a loss from the status quo. 
Because loss aversion bears on public reactions, and because the public might 
be outraged or frightened by deaths that would not otherwise have occurred, 
regulators might have to work carefully to prevent beneficial new technologies 
from being discredited. 
To test these questions, I conducted a survey on Amazon’s Mechanical 
Turk, asking about 400 people to assume that in a city in their state, officials 
were deciding whether to go forward with a pilot project allowing automated 
vehicles on the road. Then I asked respondents this: 
Imagine that the experts project that if automated vehicles are allowed, they 
would be responsible for 15 accidents that would not have otherwise occurred, 
during the next six months—but that automated vehicles would also prevent 50 
accidents that would otherwise have occurred, in those next six months. 
The question was whether the project should go forward. Fully 84% said 
“yes.” When I changed the numbers to 20/30 (for another group), a strong 
majority (74%) again said “yes.” A strong majority appears not to be loss 
averse, at least in the sense that they think that fewer overall accidents is the 
right test. 
In general, the majority is correct on that point. But there is a 
countervailing consideration. Suppose that we are dealing with fat tails on both 
sides. (Recall that fat tails mean that at the extremes, probabilities are unusually 
high.) If things go very badly, we might have a catastrophe. If things go very 
well, we might have a miracle. Reasonable regulators might prevent a possible 
catastrophe, even if the price is to prevent a possible miracle. The downside 
risk of (say) extinction might reasonably be seen to deserve more attention than 
the upside potential of (say) immortality. 
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IV. Uncertainty and Ignorance 
Now let us turn to what are, in a sense, the largest issues. In some 
contexts, risk-related problems involve hazards of ascertainable probability.80 It 
may well be possible to say that the risk of death, from a certain activity, is 
1/100,000, or at least that it ranges from (say) 1/20,000 to 1/500,000, with an 
exposed population of (say) 10 million. Or it may be possible to say that the 
risk of catastrophic harm from some activity is under 10% but above 1%. But 
as we have seen, it is possible to imagine instances in which analysts cannot 
specify even a range of probability, easily or at all,81 perhaps because they are 
frequentists who cannot find relevant frequencies, or perhaps because they are 
Bayesians who lack necessary information. Hence, regulators, and ordinary 
people, are sometimes acting in a situation of Knightian uncertainty (where 
outcomes can be identified but no probabilities can be assigned) rather than risk 
(where outcomes can be identified and probabilities assigned to various 
outcomes).82 And they are sometimes acting under conditions of ignorance, in 
which they are unable to specify either the probability of bad outcomes or their 
nature—where regulators do not even know the magnitude of the harms that 
they are facing.83 One reason might be that they are dealing with a unique or 
nonrepeatable event. Another reason might be that they are dealing with a 
problem involving interacting components of a system, in which regulators 
cannot know much about how components of the system are likely to interact 
with each other.84 
A. Strategies of Avoidance 
Of course, it is also true that over time, some problems that involve 
ignorance might shift to problems of uncertainty, and that problems of 
uncertainty might shift to problems of risk—a point that may counsel in favor 
of delay while new information is received. OMB Circular A-4 emphasizes this 
point: “For example, when the uncertainty is due to a lack of data, you might 
consider deferring the decision, as an explicit regulatory alternative, pending 
further study to obtain sufficient data.”85 But as the circular notes, “Delaying a 
decision will also have costs, as will further efforts at data gathering and 
 
80. In the remainder of this Article, I draw heavily on a section of Cass R. Sunstein, 
Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841 (2006), while also revising and updating the 
discussion in significant ways. 
81.  KIYOHIKO G. NISHIMURA & HIROYUKI OZAKI, ECONOMICS OF PESSIMISM AND 
OPTIMISM: THEORY OF KNIGHTIAN UNCERTAINTY AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2017); KNIGHT, supra note 
1.  
82. See id.; Paul Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post-
Keynesian Perspective, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 129 (1991). 
83. On ignorance and precaution, see Poul Harremoes, Ethical Aspects of Scientific 
Incertitude in Environmental Analysis and Decision Making, 11 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 705 (2003). 
84. See Taleb et al., supra note 4. 
85. See Circular A-4, supra note 3. 
09. SUNSTEIN ARTICLE. FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2020 8:02 PM 
Yale Journal on Regulation Vol. 37:940 2020 
966 
analysis.”86 Delay of regulation may mean serious harm (including large 
numbers of deaths; consider the coronavirus pandemic of 2020). In principle, 
agencies would calculate the costs and benefits of delay. But because of the 
very problem that counsels in favor of delay (lack of information), that 
calculation is not possible. 
It is also true that agencies might use breakeven analysis to make progress 
in the face of uncertainty (at least if it is bounded).87 Suppose, for example, that 
the costs of regulation are $100 million, that the benefits range from $150 
million to $5 billion, and that technical analysts state that at the present time, 
they cannot assign probabilities to the lower or upper bound, or to points along 
the range. Even so, it is clear that the regulation should go forward. Or suppose 
that the monetized costs of some new technology (say, a variation on fracking) 
are $500 million, but that the monetized benefits range from $600 million to 
$10 billion. A regulatory ban would not be a good idea. We could easily 
imagine variations on these numbers. Breakeven analysis can enable regulators 
to identify reasonable paths forward even in the midst of uncertainty. 
The Principle of Insufficient Reason says that when people lack 
information about probabilities (say, 1% to 40%), they should act as if each 
probability is equally likely.88 But why is it rational to do so? By hypothesis, 
there is no reason to believe that each probability is equally likely. Making that 
assumption is no better than making some other, very different assumption. The 
Principle of Insufficient Reason is essentially arbitrary.89 
B. Into the Thicket 
When strategies of avoidance are unappealing or unsuccessful, regulators 
might be drawn to the maximin rule: Choose the policy with the best worst-case 
outcome.90 In the context of regulation of pandemics or new technologies, for 
example, perhaps elaborate precautions can be justified by reference to the 
maximin rule, asking officials to identify the worst case among the various 
options, and to select that option whose worst-case is least bad. Perhaps the 
maximin rule would lead to a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle, by, 
for example, urging elaborate steps to combat potential risks. It follows that if 
aggressive measures are justified to reduce the risks associated with emerging 
technologies, one reason is that those risks are potentially catastrophic and 
existing science does not enable us to assign probabilities to the worst-case 
scenarios. The same analysis might be applied to many problems, including the 
 
86. Id.  
87. See Cass R. Sunstein, The Limits of Quantification, 102 CAL. L. REV. 1369 (2014). 
88. See LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 18, at 284; JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 
146 (revised ed. 1999) (“When we have no evidence at all, the possible cases are stipulated to be equally 
probable”). 
89. See KAY & KING, supra note 13, at 63–64. 
90. For a technical treatment of the possible rationality of maximin, see Arrow & 
Hurwicz, supra note 49; for a non-technical overview, see ELSTER, supra note 2, at 185-207. 
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risks associated with genetically modified food,91 nuclear energy,92 pandemics, 
and terrorism. 
To understand these claims, we need to back up a bit. I have suggested 
that maximin has sometimes been recommended under circumstances of 
uncertainty rather than risk.93 In an influential discussion, John Rawls, focusing 
on justice, offers a justification for a rule that “directs our attention to the worst 
that can happen.”94 As he puts it, “this unusual rule” is plausible in light of 
“three chief features of situations.”95 The first is that we cannot assign 
probabilities to outcomes, or at least we are extremely uncertain of them. The 
second is that the chooser “has a conception of the good such that he cares very 
little, if anything, for what he might gain above the minimum stipend that he 
can, in fact, be sure of by following the maximin rule.”96 For that reason, it “is 
not worthwhile for him to take a chance for the sake of further advantage.” The 
third is that “the rejected alternatives have outcomes that one can hardly 
accept.” In other words, they involve “grave risks.” Under the stated 
conditions, the gains are limited from running a catastrophic risk, which means 
that choosers do not much value them, and it is worthwhile giving them up to 
protect against a downside outcome that choosers deplore. 
Rawls emphasizes that the three “features work most effectively in 
combination,” which means that the “paradigm situation for following the 
maximin rule is when all three features are realized to the highest degree.”97 
That means that the rule does not “generally apply, nor of course is it self-
evident.”98 It is “a maxim, a rule of thumb, that comes in its own in special 
circumstances,” and “its application depends upon the qualitative structure of 
the possible gains and losses in its relation to one’s conception of the good, all 
this against a background in which it is reasonable to discount conjectural 
estimates of likelihoods.”99 
Rawls’ own argument is that for purposes of justice, the original position, 
as he understands it, is “defined so that it is a situation in which the maximin 
rule applies”100—which helps to justify his principles of justice. It is 
 
91. TALEB ET AL., supra note 4. 
92. See Jon Elster, Explaining Technical Change: A Case Study in the Philosophy of 
Science 188-205 (1979) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
93. See, e.g., ELSTER, supra note 2, 188-205 (1983). 
94. See RAWLS, supra note 88, at 132-39. Rawls draws on but adapts WILLIAM 
FELLNER, PROBABILITY AND PROFIT 140-42 (1965). 
95. RAWLS, supra note 88, at 134. 
96. Id. 
97. Id. 
98. I am cheating a little bit here, referring to the original rather than the revised 
version of Rawls’ book. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 155 (1971). (Sometimes the original is 
best.) It should be noted that in later work in particular, Rawls emphasized the Kantian foundations of 
the Veil of Ignorance, see JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993), and those ideas could also be 
connected with the difference principle. I am bracketing that discussion for my purposes here. 
99. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 155 (1971). 
100. Id. (Note: This is only in the original, again.) 
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worthwhile noting that the same argument can help to identify situations in 
which maximax applies. Assume, first, that people are acting under conditions 
of uncertainty, or close to it. Assume, second, that the chooser “has a 
conception of the good such that he cares greatly for what he might gain by 
following the maximax rule.” Assume, finally, that grave or even significant 
risks are not involved, which is to say that if things go sour, and the chooser 
does not end up with the best possible outcome, he is nonetheless well enough 
off, given his conception of the good. 
We can think of these cases as involving something akin to a “negative 
freeroll”: a choice in which one can incur losses but obtain no (real) gains.101 
Who wants that? In such cases, applying maximin seems quite rational. 
C. Precautions Again 
These points bear on regulatory policy, where Rawls’ defense of maximin 
has inspired a defense and reconstruction of the Precautionary Principle in an 
important essay by Stephen Gardiner.102 To make the underlying intuition 
clear, Gardiner begins with the problem of choosing between two options, A 
and B: 
If you choose A, then there are two possible outcomes: either (A1) you will 
receive $100, or (A2) you will be shot. If you choose B, there are also two 
possible outcomes: either (B1) you will receive $50, or (B2) you will receive a 
slap on the wrist. According to a maximin strategy, one should choose B. This is 
because: (A2) (getting shot) is the worst outcome on option A and (B2) (getting 
a slap on the wrist) is the worst option on plan B; and (A2) is worse than 
(B2).103 
It should be immediately apparent that if we can assign probabilities to 
outcomes, A might turn out to be the better choice. Suppose that if you choose 
A, there is a 99.99999% chance of A1, and that if you choose B, there is a 
99.99999% chance of (B2). If so, A might seem better. But let us stipulate that 
assignment of probabilities is not possible. In Gardiner’s view, this conclusion 
helps support what he calls the Rawlsian Core Precautionary Principle in the 
regulatory setting: when Rawls’ three conditions are met, precautions, 
understood as efforts to avoid the worst-case scenario, should be adopted. As 
he puts it: “If one really were faced with the genuine possibility of disaster, 
cared little for the potential gains to be made by avoiding disaster and had no 
reliable information about how likely the disaster was to occur, then, other 
things being equal, choosing to run the risk might well seem like a foolhardy 
and thereby extreme option.”104 
 
101. I am grateful to Annie Duke for this point. 
102. See Stephen Gardiner, The Core Precautionary Principle, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 33 
(2006). 
103. Id. at 46. 
104. Id. at 49. 
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Gardiner adds, importantly, that to justify the maximin rule, the threat 
posed by the worst-case scenario must satisfy some minimal threshold of 
plausibility. In his view, “the range of outcomes considered are in some 
appropriate sense ‘realistic,’ so that, for example, only credible threats are 
considered.”105 If they can be dismissed as unrealistic, then maximin should not 
be followed. Gardiner believes that the problem of climate change, and also 
that of genetically modified organisms, can be usefully analyzed in these terms 
and that it presents a good case for the application of the maximin rule: 
The RCPP [Rawlsian Core Precautionary Principle] appears to work well with 
those global environmental issues often said to constitute paradigm cases for the 
precautionary principle, such as climate change and genetically-modified crops. 
For reasonable cases can be made that the Rawlsian conditions are satisfied in 
these instances. For example, standard thinking about climate change provides 
strong reasons for thinking that it satisfies the Rawlsian criteria. First, the 
“absence of reliable probabilities” condition is satisfied because the inherent 
complexity of the climate system produces uncertainty about the size, 
distribution and timing of the costs of climate change. Second, the “unacceptable 
outcomes” condition is met because it is reasonable to believe that the costs of 
climate change are likely to be high, and may possibly be catastrophic. Third, 
the “care little for gains” condition is met because the costs of stabilizing 
emissions, though large in an absolute sense, are said to be manageable within 
the global economic system, especially in relation to the potential costs of 
climate change.106 
Gardiner adds, sensibly, that to justify maximin, the threats that are 
potentially catastrophic must satisfy some minimal threshold of plausibility.107 
Gardiner believes that the problem of climate change can be usefully analyzed 
in these terms and that it presents a good case for the application of 
maximin.108 In a similar vein, Jon Elster, speaking of nuclear power, contends 
that maximin is the appropriate choice when it is possible to identify the worst-
case scenario and when the alternatives have the same best consequences.109 A 
related argument, ventured by Nassim Nicholas Taleb et al. in an illuminating 
discussion and specification of the Precautionary Principle, is that genetically 
modified crops pose a “ruin” problem, involving a low probability of 
catastrophically high costs.110 
Taleb et al. contend that for such problems, it is best to take strong 
precautions—in this case, placing “severe limits” on genetically modified food. 
The discussion is technical, but let us bracket the science and suppose that it is 
correct. If so, the question is whether genetically modified crops really do 
 
105. Id. at 51. 
106. Id. at 55. 
107. See id. at 51-52. There are some conceptual puzzles here. If an outcome can be 
dismissed as unrealistic, then we are able to assign at least some probabilities. Gardiner’s argument must 
be that in some cases we might know that the likelihood that a bad outcome will occur really is trivial.  
108. See id. at 55. 
109. See ELSTER, supra note 2, at 203. 
110. TALEB ET AL., supra note 4. 
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create ruin problems. Perhaps they do, but it is also possible to read the most 
recent science to suggest that they do not; if the probability of catastrophic 
harm is vanishingly low and essentially zero, rather than merely very low, we 
can fairly ask whether Taleb’s argument applies. If they can be dismissed as 
unrealistic, then maximin should not be followed. 
But the larger point is that in identifiable circumstances, the argument for 
the maximin rule seems plausible. Taken seriously, this conclusion would have 
real consequences for regulatory policy, perhaps especially in the context of 
new risks or emerging technologies. 
V. Four Objections 
A. Triviality 
An evident problem with this argument is that it risks triviality.111 If 
individuals and societies can eliminate an uncertain danger of catastrophe for 
essentially no cost, then of course they should eliminate that risk. If people are 
asked to pay $1 to avoid a potentially catastrophic risk to which probabilities 
cannot be assigned, they might as well pay $1. And if two options have the 
same best-case scenario, and if the first has a far better worst-case scenario, 
people should of course choose the first option. 
There is nothing wrong with this argument, but the real world rarely 
presents problems of this form. Where policy and law are disputed, the 
elimination of uncertain dangers of catastrophe imposes both costs and risks. In 
the context of climate change, for example, it is implausible to say that 
regulatory choosers can or should care “very little, if anything,” for what might 
be lost by following maximin. If nations followed maximin for climate change, 
they would spend a great deal to reduce greenhouse gas emissions.112 The 
result would almost certainly be higher prices for gasoline and energy, probably 
producing increases in unemployment and poverty. 
Something similar can be said about genetic modification of food, because 
elimination of the worst-case scenario, through aggressive regulation, might 
well eliminate an inexpensive source of nutrition that would have exceptionally 
valuable effects on countless people who live under circumstances of extreme 
 
111. Cf. David Kelsey, Choice Under Partial Uncertainty, 34 INT’L ECON. REV. 297, 
305 (1993): 
It is often argued that lexicographic decision rules such as maximin are irrational, since in 
economics we would not expect an individual to be prepared to make a small improvement in 
one of his objectives at the expense of large sacrifices in all of his other objectives. This 
criticism is less powerful in the current context since we have assumed that the decision maker 
has a weak order rather than a cardinal utility function on the space of outcomes. Given this 
assumption the terms “large” and ‘“small” used in the above argument are not meaningful. 
In many contexts, however, decision makers do have a cardinal utility function, not merely a weak 
order. 
112. See WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD: 
ECONOMIC MODELS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 168 (2000). 
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deprivation.113 If we eliminate the worst-case scenarios for all pandemic risks, 
people will simply be required to stay at home, today, tomorrow, and the day 
after. While that might be the right approach, the fact that a very bad worst-case 
scenario is associated with the pandemic (worse, let us stipulate, than the worst-
case associated with the mandate) cannot easily be taken to justify that mandate 
without trying to know more about probabilities. 
The real question, then, is whether regulators should embrace maximin in 
real-world cases in which doing so is costly or extremely costly. If they should, 
it is because condition (3) is too stringent and should be abandoned. Even if the 
costs of following the maximin rule are significant, and even if regulators care 
a great deal about incurring those costs, the question is whether it makes sense 
to follow the maximin rule when they face uncertain dangers of catastrophe. In 
the environmental context, some people have so claimed.114 This claim takes us 
directly to the next objection to maximin. 
B. Maximin Assumes Infinite Risk Aversion 
Rawls’ arguments in favor of adopting maximin, for purposes of 
distributive justice, were subject to withering critiques from economists—
critiques that many economists accept to this day.115 The central challenge was 
that the maximin principle would be chosen only if choosers showed infinite 
risk aversion. In the words of one of Rawls’ most influential critics, infinite 
risk aversion “is unlikely. Even though the stakes are great, people may well 
wish to trade a reduction in the assured floor against the provision of larger 
gains. But if risk aversion is less than infinite, the outcome will not be 
maximin.”116 To be more specific: suppose that you have a choice between two 
options. Option A has a 99.9999% likelihood of great wealth and welfare and a 
0.0001% likelihood of a terrible outcome. Option B has a 60% chance of a very 
bad outcome and a 40% chance of a just-short-of-terrible outcome. Would it 
really make sense to choose Option B? 
To adapt this objection to the environmental context: it is plausible to 
assume a bounded degree of risk aversion with respect to catastrophic harms, to 
support some modest forms of a Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle. 
But even under circumstances of uncertainty—the argument goes—maximin is 
senseless unless societies are to show infinite risk aversion. 
 
113. See Kym Anderson & Chantal Pohl Nielsen, Golden Rice and the Looming GMO 
Debate: Implications for the Poor 7-8 (Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper No. 
4195, 2004), https://ssrn.com/abstract=508463 [https://perma.cc/Q8NP-JDV4]. 
114. See Richard T. Woodward and Richard C. Bishop, How to Decide When Experts 
Disagree: Uncertainty-Based Choice Rules in Environmental Policy, 73 LAND ECON. 492, 505 (1997). 
115. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow, Some Ordinalist-Utilitarian Notes on Rawls’ Theory 
of Justice, 70 J. PHIL. 245 (1973); Harsanyi, supra note 66. 
116. Musgrave, supra note 69, at 627.  
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This is a standard challenge, but it is wrong, because maximin does not 
assume infinite risk aversion.117 By stipulation, we are dealing with situations 
in which probabilities cannot plausibly be assigned to various outcomes.118 
Perhaps that is rare in the regulatory context. But in principle, the objection that 
maximin assumes infinite risk aversion depends on a denial that uncertainty 
exists; it assumes that subjective choices will be made and that they will reveal 
subjective probabilities. It is true that subjective choices will be made. But such 
choices do not establish that objective uncertainty does not exist. To see why, it 
is necessary to engage that question directly. 
C. Uncertainty Does Not Exist 
Many economists have denied the existence of uncertainty.119 Milton 
Friedman, for example, writes of the risk-uncertainty distinction that “I have 
not referred to this distinction because I do not believe it is valid. I follow L.J. 
Savage in his view of personal probability, which denies any valid distinction 
along these lines. We may treat people as if they assigned numerical 
probabilities to every conceivable event.”120 Friedman and other skeptics are 
correct to insist that people’s choices suggest that they assign probabilities to 
events. On a widespread view, an understanding of people’s choices can be 
taken as evidence of subjective probabilities. People’s decisions about whether 
to fly or instead to drive, whether to go to a store during a pandemic, whether to 
walk in certain neighborhoods at night, and whether to take risky jobs can be 
understood as an implicit assignment of probabilities to events. Indeed, 
regulators themselves make decisions, including decisions about climate 
change, from which subjective probabilities can be calculated. 
But none of this makes for anything like a good objection to Knight, who 
was concerned with objective probabilities rather than subjective choices.121 
 
117. See C.Y. Cyrus Chu & Wen-Fang Liu, A Dynamic Characterization of Rawls’s 
Maximin Principle: Theory and Implications, 12 CONST. POL. ECON. 255, 268 (2001). 
118. See id. at 264-65. 
119. For an account and a lament, see KAY & KING, supra note 13, at 106-54. 
120. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, PRICE THEORY 282 (1976); see also JACK HIRSHLEIFER 
& JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND INFORMATION 10 (1992): 
In this book we disregard Knight’s distinction, which has proved to be a sterile one. For our 
purposes risk and uncertainty mean the same thing. It does not matter, we contend, whether an 
‘objective’ classification is or is not possible. For, we will be dealing throughout with a 
‘subjective’ probability concept (as developed especially by Savage, 1954): probability is 
simply degree of belief. . . . [Because we never know true objective probabilities, d]ecision-
makers are . . . never in Knight’s world of risk but instead always in his world of uncertainty. 
That the alternative approach, assigning probabilities on the basis of subjective degree of 
belief, is a workable and fruitful procedure will be shown constructively throughout this book. 
For the purposes of the analysis by Hirshleifer and Riley, the assignment of subjective probabilities may 
well be the best approach. But the distinction between risk and uncertainty is not sterile when regulators 
are considering what to do but lack information about the probabilities associated with various 
outcomes. 
121. See Stephen F. LeRoy & Larry D. Singell, Jr., Knight on Risk and Uncertainty, 
95 J. POL. ECON. 394 (1987) (arguing that, against many critics, that Knight’s work supported the idea 
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Animals, no less than human beings, make choices from which subjective 
probabilities can be assigned. But the existence of subjective probabilities—
from dogs, horses, and elephants—does not mean that animals do not ever face 
(objective) uncertainty. 
Suppose that the question is the likelihood that at least one hundred 
million human beings will be alive in 10,000 years. For most people, equipped 
with the knowledge that they have, no probability can sensibly be assigned. 
Perhaps uncertainty is not unbounded; the likelihood can reasonably be 
described as above 0% and below 100%. (I think.) But beyond that point, there 
is little to say. Or suppose that I present you with an urn, containing 250 balls, 
and ask you to pick one; if you pick a blue ball, you receive $1000, but if you 
pick a green ball, you have to pay me $1000. Suppose that I refuse to disclose 
the proportion of blue and green balls in the urn—or suppose that the 
proportion has been determined by a computer, which has been programmed by 
someone that neither you nor I know. You can make a pick, but what does that 
tell us about actual probabilities? Regulators may be in a similar position at the 
early stage of a pandemic or when dealing with a new technology. These 
examples suggest that it is wrong to deny the possible existence of uncertainty, 
signaled by the absence of objective probabilities.122 
For Friedman and other skeptics about uncertainty, there is an additional 
problem. When necessary, human beings do assign subjective probabilities to 
future events. So what? The assignment can be a function of how the situation 
is described, and formally identical descriptions can produce radically different 
judgments. There is reason to believe, for example, that people will not give the 
same answer to the question, “What is the likelihood that 80% of people will 
suffer an adverse effect from a certain risk?” and to the question, “What is the 
likelihood that 20% of people will not suffer an adverse effect from a certain 
risk?”123 The merely semantic reframing may well affect probability 
judgments.124 
In any case, probability judgments are notoriously unreliable because they 
are frequently based on heuristics and biases that lead to severe and systematic 
errors.125 Suppose that subjective probability estimates are rooted in the 
 
of subjective probabilities). For a vigorous and sustained argument on behalf of the pervasiveness of 
uncertainty, see KAY & KING, supra note 13, at 35–49. For a clear explanation of why uncertainty 
exists, see ELSTER, supra note 2, at 193–99, 199 (“One could certainly elicit from a political scientist the 
subjective probability that he attaches to the prediction that Norway in the year 3000 will be a 
democracy rather than a dictatorship, but would anyone even contemplate acting on the basis of this 
numerical magnitude?”). 
122. See ELSTER, supra note 2, at 195–99. 
123. See id. 
124. Id. 
125. For a good overview of this topic, see JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND 
DECIDING 125–47 (3d ed. 2000). Elster briefly notes how this point relates to the debate over 
uncertainty: “There are too many well-known mechanisms that distort our judgment, from wishful 
thinking to rigid cognitive structures, for us to be able to attach much weight to the numerical 
magnitudes that can be elicited by the standard method of asking subjects to choose between 
hypothetical options.” ELSTER, supra note 2, at 199 (internal citations omitted). 
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availability heuristic, leading people to exaggerate risks for which examples 
readily come to mind (“availability bias”) and also to underestimate risks for 
which examples are cognitively unavailable (“unavailability bias”).126 Why 
should regulators believe that subjective estimates, subject as they are to 
framing, heuristics, and biases, have any standing in the face of the objective 
difficulty or impossibility of making probability judgments? 
Even if individuals and governments assign subjective probabilities, do 
their assignments bear on what ought to be done? As Elster puts it, speaking of 
scientists and bureaucrats: “There are too many well-known mechanisms that 
distort our judgment, from wishful thinking to rigid cognitive structures, for us 
to attach much weight to the numerical magnitudes that can be elicited by the 
standard method of asking subjects to choose between hypothetical options.”127 
Even if this account is too pessimistic (as I think it is), there are some problems 
for which merely subjective probabilities cannot plausibly be taken to show 
that we are operating in circumstances of risk rather than uncertainty. In any 
case, recall the benefits ranges reported above, in which officials declined to 
offer probability estimates, evidently on the ground that no adequate evidence 
was thought to support them. 
Writing in 1937, Keynes, often taken to be a critic of the idea of 
uncertainty, clearly saw the distinction between objective probabilities and 
actual behavior: “The sense in which I am using the term [‘uncertain’ 
knowledge] is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain . . . . 
About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable 
probability whatever. We simply do not know.”128 This is so even if, as Keynes 
immediately added, we act “exactly as we should if we had behind us a good 
Benthamite calculation of a series of prospective advantages and disadvantages, 
each multiplied by its appropriate probability, waiting to be summed.”129 Even 
if subjective expected utilities can be assigned on the basis of behavior, 
regulators (like everyone else) may well be operating in circumstances of 
genuine uncertainty. 
D. Uncertainty is Rare 
Notwithstanding these points, regulatory problems do not typically 
involve genuine uncertainty. Using frequentist strategies, regulators are often 
able to assign probabilities to outcomes, and Bayesian approaches can also be 
used. When they cannot, perhaps they can instead assign probabilities to 
probabilities (or even, where this proves impossible, probabilities to 
 
126. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment under 
Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 
(Daniel Kahneman ed., 1982). 
127. See ELSTER, supra note 2, at 199.  
128. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, A TREATISE ON PROBABILITY 214 (1921). 
129. Id. 
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probabilities of probabilities). In many cases, regulators might be able to 
specify a range of probabilities saying, for example, that the probability of 
catastrophic outcomes from a pandemic or climate change is above 2% but 
below 30%.130 At least some scientists and economists believe that climate 
change is not likely to create truly catastrophic harm, and that the real costs, 
human and economic, will be very high but not intolerable. In their view, the 
worst of the worst-case scenarios can be responsibly described as improbable. 
Whatever we think of that example, perhaps we can agree that pure 
uncertainty is rare.131 Perhaps we can agree that at worst, regulatory problems 
involve problems of “bounded uncertainty,” in which we cannot assign 
probabilities within specified bands. It is possible to think, for example, that the 
risk of a catastrophic outcome is above 1% but below 10%, without being able 
to assign probabilities within that band. The pervasiveness of uncertainty 
depends on what is actually known. If uncertainty is rare, then Rawls’ 
argument, or variations on it, do not apply outside of exotic cases. Fair enough. 
But even if this is so, exotic cases may turn out to be important. 
 
130. I am bracketing here frequentist claims about the pervasiveness of uncertainty. 
See KAY & KING, supra note 13, at 35-49. Even if we are frequentists, regulators are often dealing with 
repeated cases for which frequentist assignments of probability are perfectly feasible; consider food 
safety, occupational safety, and air pollution.  
131. But see KAY & KING, supra note 13. In their provocative and spirited book, Kay 
and King are very hard on the idea of maximizing expected value, emphasizing that we often do not 
know enough to do anything like that. Instead of generating numbers, they urge that regulators, officials, 
and others should ask, “What is going on here?” See id. at 10. They also ask for close attention to 
“narratives.” Id. at 178-95. This is not the space to explore their analysis and their proposals, but in 
brief, the “What is going on here?” question cannot easily yield sensible answers. How can regulators 
possibly know how to handle (say) food safety, nanotechnology, genetic modification of food, if that is 
their question? The analysis is best disciplined at least through a rough sense of both probabilities and 
outcomes, which is often obtainable; lacking those, maximin is a candidate solution.  
Revealingly, Kay and King defend the “What is going on here?” question in part by reference to 
President Barack Obama’s decision to kill Osama Bin Laden without knowing that Bin Laden was 
actually present in the relevant location. Id. at 8-9. In my view (and I was in the White House at the 
time, though not involved in any way with the decision), this is not a helpful example; it counts strongly 
against the central argument offered by Kay and King. Obama’s decision was Bayesian, and it involved 
a careful assessment of costs and benefits (and hence expected value). Roughly: The benefits of killing 
Bin Laden would be very high; the costs of failing would be high but manageable; the likelihood that he 
was present fell within an ascertainable range (in the vicinity of 50%, id. at 8); and importantly, the 
likelihood that he would be found, in the future, was relatively low. My experience is that public 
officials approach many non-repeatable events in this way, not by asking, “What is going on here?” 
In addition, Kay & King rightly draw attention to the importance of resilience and robustness, as 
ways of handling uncertain risks. Id. at 423–25. (Consider the risks associated with climate change and 
pandemics.) But how resilient, and how robust? Resilience and robustness can be very costly indeed. We 
would want to spend infinite costs, today, to create resilience against a pandemic in a decade. Under 
conditions of risk, or of bounded uncertainty, calculation of expected value can be more than helpful, 
and for reasons discussed in text, maximin has its place. “Narrative,” by contrast, is not of much use. I 
am acutely aware that these are complex topics and that what I have said here is inadequate; it should be 
taken as a kind of a promissory note. 
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VI. A Path Forward 
A great deal of work asks whether people really should follow maximin 
under circumstances of uncertainty.132 Some of this work draws on people’s 
intuitions, in a way that illuminates actual beliefs but may tell us little about 
what rationality requires.133 Other work is highly formal,134 adopting certain 
axioms and seeing whether maximin violates them. The results of this work are 
not conclusive.135 Certainly, maximin cannot be been ruled out as a candidate 
for rational choice under uncertainty. 
I will rest content with three general suggestions. First: As we have seen, 
the maximin rule is sometimes justified by standard cost-benefit analysis. If 
some potential outcomes are genuinely catastrophic and not highly improbable, 
eliminating them might be the approach that maximizes net benefits. Even if 
such outcomes are highly improbable (say, 1 in 100,000), the same conclusion 
might be the right one, if the expected value of precautions outweighs their 
expected costs. 
Second: In the face of fat tails on the left-hand side (suggesting a higher-
than-normal risk of catastrophe, as in “ruin problems”), there may be a good 
argument for the maximin rule, again depending on the numbers (and on what 
is known and what is unknown). 
Third: Uncertainty is real; sometimes regulators lack information about 
probabilities. In deciding whether to follow the maximin rule under 
circumstances of Knightian uncertainty, or something close to it (such as 
bounded uncertainty), a great deal should turn on two questions: (a) How bad is 
the worst-case scenario, compared to other bad outcomes? (b) What, exactly, is 
lost by choosing the maximin rule? Of course, it is possible that choosers, 
including regulators, will lack the information that would enable them to 
answer these questions. But (and this is the central point) in the regulatory 
context, answers to both (a) and (b) may well be possible even if it is not 
possible to assign probabilities to the various outcomes with any confidence. 
By emphasizing the relative badness of the worst-case scenario, and the extent 
of the loss from attending to it, I am attempting to build on the Rawls/Gardiner 
suggestion that maximin is the preferred decision rule when little is lost from 
following it. 
To see the relevance of the two questions, suppose that you are choosing 
between two options. The first has a best-case outcome of 10 and a worst-case 
outcome of –5. The second has a best-case outcome of 15 and a worst-case 
outcome of –6. It is impossible to assign probabilities to the various outcomes. 
Maximin would favor the first option, to avoid the worse worst-case (which is -
 
132. See, e.g., Arrow & Hurwicz, supra note 49 (suggesting the rationality of either 
maximin or maximax). 
133. See Harsanyi, supra note 66. 
134. See, e.g., LUCE & RAIFFA, supra note 18, at 286–97 (1957). 
135. See id. 
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6); but to justify that choice, we have to know something about the meaning of 
the differences between 10 and 15 on the one hand and –5 and –6 on the other. 
If 15 is much better than 10, and if the difference between –5 and –6 is a matter 
of relative indifference, then the choice of the first option is hardly mandated. 
But if the difference between –5 and –6 greatly matters—if it is a matter of life 
and death—then the maximin rule is much more attractive. 
Consider a regulatory analogue. Suppose that as compared with a ban, 
allowing automated vehicles would have a best-case outcome of $2 billion in 
annual net benefits and a worst-case outcome of $10 million in annual net 
losses. Suppose that we cannot assign probabilities to the various outcomes. 
Under the maximin rule, we should ban automated vehicles. But if the net loss 
of $10 million is not a big deal, we might reject the maximin rule on something 
like the Rawls/Gardiner theory. Of course we could vary the numbers in such a 
way as to make the maximin rule much more attractive. 
These points have the important implication of suggesting the possibility 
of a (rough) cost-benefit analysis of whether to follow the maximin rule under 
conditions of both risk and uncertainty. Sometimes the worst-case is the worst 
by far, and sometimes we lose relatively little by choosing the maximin rule. It 
is typically thought necessary to assign probabilities in order to engage in cost-
benefit balancing; without an understanding of probabilities, such balancing 
might not seem able to get off the ground. But a crude version of cost-benefit 
balancing is possible even without reliable information about probability. For 
the balancing exercise to work, of course, it must be possible to produce 
cardinal rankings among the outcomes—that is, it must be possible to rank 
them not merely in terms of their badness but also in at least rough terms of 
how much worse each is than the less-bad others. That approach will not work 
if cardinal rankings are not feasible—as might be the case if (for example) it is 
not easy to compare the catastrophic loss from a pandemic with the loss from 
huge expenditures on efforts to control a pandemic. Much of the time, however, 
cardinal rankings are possible in the regulatory context. 
Here is a simpler way to put the point. It is often assumed that in order to 
undertake cost-benefit analysis, it is necessary to assign probabilities, with the 
understanding that point estimates represent the average or most probable case. 
But in some cases, a sensible rule-of-thumb can be adopted without assigning 
probabilities. An understanding of the magnitude of the relevant payoffs can 
help regulators to navigate difficult situations. If one option has a large 
downside but no substantial upside, it can be rejected in favor of one that lacks 
that downside but that has a roughly equivalent upside. 
To appreciate the need for some kind of analysis of the effects of 
following the maximin rule, imagine an individual or society lacking the 
information that would permit the assignment of probabilities to a series of 
hazards with catastrophic outcomes; suppose that the number of hazards is ten, 
or twenty, or a thousand. Suppose too that such an individual or society is able 
to assign probabilities (ranging from 1% to 90%) to an equivalent number of 
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other hazards, with outcomes that range from bad to extremely bad, but never 
catastrophic. Suppose, finally, that every one of these hazards can be eliminated 
at a cost—a cost that is high, but that does not, once incurred in individual 
cases, inflict harms that count as extremely bad or catastrophic. The maximin 
rule suggests that our individual or society should spend a great deal to 
eliminate each of the ten, or twenty, or thousand potentially catastrophic 
hazards. But once that amount is spent on even one of those hazards, there 
might be nothing left to combat the extremely bad hazards, even those with a 
90% chance of occurring. We could even imagine that a poorly informed 
individual or society would be condemned to real poverty and distress, or even 
worse, merely by virtue of following maximin. In these circumstances, the 
maximin rule should be rejected. 
This suggestion derives indirect support from the empirical finding that 
when asked to decide on the distribution of goods and services, most people 
reject the two most widely discussed principles in the philosophical literature: 
average utility, favored by Harsanyi, and Rawls’ difference principle (allowing 
inequalities only if they work to the advantage to the least well-off).136 Instead, 
people choose average utility with a floor constraint—that is, they favor an 
approach that maximizes overall well-being, but subject to the constraint that 
no member of society may fall below a decent minimum.137 Insisting on an 
absolute welfare minimum to all, they maximize over that floor. Their aversion 
to especially bad outcomes leads them to a pragmatic threshold in the form of 
the floor. So too, very plausibly, in the context of precautions against risks. A 
sensible individual, or society, would not always choose maximin under 
circumstances of risk or uncertainty. Everything depends on what is lost, and 
what is gained, by eliminating the worst-case scenario; and much of the time, 
available information makes it possible to answer those questions at least in 
general terms. 
If we apply these various points, we can easily imagine an amendment to 
OMB Circular A-4 that takes the following form138: 
In general, it is appropriate to focus on costs and benefits, calculated by 
reference to the expected value of various options. Thus, your analysis should 
include two fundamental components: a quantitative analysis characterizing the 
probabilities of the relevant outcomes and an assignment of economic value to 
the projected outcomes. It is essential that both parts be conceptually consistent. 
In particular, the quantitative analysis should be conducted in a way that 
permits it to be applied within the more general analytical framework of benefit-
cost analysis. If one or another outcome is potentially catastrophic (a “worst 
case”), it might make sense to eliminate it, if the analysis shows that doing that 
maximizes net benefits. In considering potential catastrophe, you should 
 
136. NORMAN FROHLICH & JOE A. OPPENHEIMER, CHOOSING JUSTICE: AN 
EXPERIMENTAL APPROACH TO ETHICAL THEORY (1992). 
137. Id. 
138. Significant parts of the italicized text are drawn from the current version of 
Circular A-4, supra note 3.  
09. SUNSTEIN ARTICLE. FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 7/29/2020 8:02 PM 
Maximin 
979 
consider the possibility of “fat tails,” which arise when the probability of 
extreme negative outcomes is unusually high. Complex systems may be 
especially prone to fat tails. 
 
In some cases, it may not be feasible to come up with probability distributions. If 
so, your analysis should be as complete as the available evidence permits. For 
example, it might include a specification of lower and upper bounds, with a 
qualitative analysis of their respective likelihoods (to the extent possible). In 
special circumstances, you might consider avoiding the worst-case scenario and 
thus following the maximin rule, which calls for eliminating the worst of the 
worst-cases. The strongest cases for following that rule would involve three 
factors: (1) Knightian uncertainty, understood as an inability to assign 
probabilities to various options; (2) catastrophic or grave consequences from 
one option, but not from other options; and (3) low or relatively low costs, or 
low or relatively low benefits foregone, as a result of choosing the option that 
avoids the worst-case scenario. Again in cases of uncertainty, more difficult 
cases, in which (for example) the costs of avoiding the worst-case scenario are 
very high, might also justify use of the maximin rule if (for example) the worst-
case scenario is genuinely catastrophic. 
My modest claim here is that for prudent regulators, attempting to proceed 
in the midst of important epistemic gaps, the maximin rule makes most sense 
when the worst-case scenario, under one course of action, is much worse than 
the worst-case scenario under the alternative course of action, when there are 
no huge disparities in gains from either option, and when the choice of 
maximin does not result in extremely significant losses. Variations on this basic 
case will present harder challenges, but in some situations, they too will allow 
room for maximin. At the same time, it is important for prudent regulators to 
focus as well on the best-case scenarios, which may promise miracles;139 that 
possibility may provide an important cautionary note about efforts to eliminate 
risks, including those posed by new technologies. 
 
 
139. See Rowell, supra note 14. Rowell’s illuminating discussion refers to “wonders.” 
